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Comments
A Review of the Implementation of the Pennsylvania
Equal Rights Amendment
[In a case by case implementation of the amendment, we are
quite aware that we are treading with sneakers in virgin terri-
tory. . . . We fear that if we interpret the Equal Rights
Amendment as simply as would a country preacher the Bible,
we will space out social theories beyond the point of workabil-
ity.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1971 the people of this state voted to amend the Pennsylvania
Constitution by adding the following provision: "Equality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual." 2 The subject
of an equal rights amendment such as this typically arouses concern
that legal equality of the sexes will lead to social and familial chaos
or abrogation of prerogatives enjoyed by one or the other sex. Need-
less to say, equality of rights of males and females does not mean
equality of the sexes. But the distinction is a fine one that may not
aid a court which must grapple with the interpretation of a new
constitutional amendment of potentially revolutionary effect.
Courts engaged in a case by case implementation of the provision
perhaps inevitably balk at reformulating social theories, particu-
larly in the absence of a clear expression of legislative intent. The
actual impact of an equal rights amendment then, cannot be pre-
dicted easily.
Five years after passage of the Pennsylvania equal rights
amendment (ERA) it is appropriate to survey its effect on the laws
and institutions of the state. While the potential for change is enor-
mous this comment attempts only to discuss the cases, legislation
and administrative responses to the amendment, and to raise some
1. Frank v. Frank, 14 Lebanon 215, 216, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 102, 103 (C.P. 1973).
2. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28.
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questions meriting judicial or legislative attention .3 This survey first
briefly discusses the legislative history of the Pennsylvania ERA.
Then follows a discussion of the impact of the amendment in four
major areas: criminal justice, domestic relations, education, and
employment. Finally, an attempt is made to look beyond substan-
tive change and analyze the courts' reaction to the command of a
new constitutional amendment. Here the study will focus on the
standard of review the Pennsylvania courts have applied in this area
of constitutional adjudication. This aspect of the ERA is significant
because dissatisfaction with prior constitutional standards provided
the impetus for support for the new constitutional provision., The
courts' reactions show they have not taken the fundamentalist ap-
proach, as would "country preachers," but are for the most part
treading lightly through ERA territory.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In Pennsylvania the legislative history of statutory and constitu-
tional enactments is almost nonexistent. As a result there is no
official history of the proposal and passage of the Pennsylvania
ERA. However, documents from the files of a member of the Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter of the National Organization for Women, Inc.
(NOW) reveal that the initial impetus for an amendment came at
a meeting of that group in the spring of 1969. Pittsburgh NOW's
Legislation Committee was then engaged in proposing revisions of
state laws to eliminate sex discrimination. Included in NOW's pro-
posals was the amendment to the Pennsylvania constitution. 5 In
March, 1969 the NOW members had gained a legislative sponsor for
3. No attempt is made to catalog all statutes or common law rules which must fall to the
ERA. The Governor's Commission on the Status of Women is conducting a comprehensive
review of all state statutes that are gender-based. See G. MIKUS & M. WARLOW, EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT STATUTORY REVIEW PROJECT, PHASE I: RETRIEVAL AND ANALYSIS OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAW, PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION FOR WOMEN, 1975 [hereinafter cited as STATUTORY REVIEW
PROJECTl.
4. Cf., e.g., Dorsen & Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional Amendment, 6 HARV. CIv.
RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 216 (1971), discussing the federal equal rights amendment.
5. Greater Pittsburgh Area Chapter of National Organization for Women, Inc., Minutes,
February 20 and March 19, 1969 [hereinafter cited as NOW Minutes]; Hearings on the Equal
Rights Amendment Before the Pennsylvania Senate Committee on Constitutional Changes
and Federal Relations, June 1, 1972 (testimony of Jean Witter) [hereinafter cited as Witter
Testimony]. The writer wishes to thank Jean Witter of Pittsburgh for making these docu-
ments available.
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the proposal and were at work recruiting additional support and
advocacy.1,The amendment was introduced in the House on October
6, 1969, and was passed unanimously as a joint resolution by two
successive General Assemblies7 as required by the state constitu-
tion.' On May 18, 1971, the voters of the Commonwealth ratified the
Pennsylvania ERA and it became part of the state constitution.'
No reports or hearings were published by the committees which
considered the proposed amendment. Feminist groups however pre-
sented two reports to the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Changes and Federal Relations.'" These reports constituted the only
formal presentation made to the Committee at its deliberations
during the first legislative session which approved the Pennsylvania
ERA. From these documents it is possible to gain some insight into
the intent behind passage of the amendment.
It is clear that the organized proponents of the amendment felt it
was needed because the United States Supreme Court had not re-
sponded more affirmatively to sex discrimination charges under the
federal constitution." The state ERA was seen as an "effective and
expeditious"'" way to prevent enactment of discriminatory state
legislation in the future and to erase numerous instances of sex-
based classification in existing state laws. 3 A constitutional
6. State Rep. Gerald Kaufman of Pittsburgh was the first to agree to sponsor the amend-
ment, and remained the primary sponsor. NOW Minutes, supra note 5.
7. J. Res. of 1970, No. 5, [1970] Laws of Pa. 971; J. Res. of 1971, No. 2, [19711 Laws of
Pa. 767.
8. PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
9. PA. CONsT. art. I, § 28. After passage, the ERA was for some time mistakenly identified
as art. I, § 27, and some of the early cases cite it as such.
10. B.E. CRAWFORD, N.O. BOWDLER, V.W. HARRINGTON & J. WITTER, PRESENTATION TO THE
COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND FEDERAL RELATIONS-H.B. 1678-A PROPOSED
AMENDMENT TO THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION, GREATER PITTSBURGH AREA CHAPTER NA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC. (1970) [hereinafter cited as NOW REPORT]; C. EAST,
THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: WHAT IT IS, WHY IT Is NEEDED, AND THE LEGAL, ECONOMIC,
AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS, INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1970)
(hereinafter cited as EAST REPORT].
11. Equality of rights under the law for all persons, male or female, is so basic that
it should be reflected in the fundamental law of the land. Despite this, in 5th and 14th
Amendment cases alleging discrimination on the basis of sex, the U.S. Supreme Court
has never held that a law classifying persons on the basis of sex is unreasonable and,
therefore, unconstitutional.
NOW REPORT, supra note 10, at 1 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
12. Id. at 3.
13. Examples of inequities needing to be cured included discrimination in regulation of
sexual conduct and in sanctions for sex crimes, jury service laws resulting in discrimination
against men, and denial to wives of the right to sue for loss of consortium. Id. at 2-3.
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amendment, its supporters believed, would be largely self-
executing-impliedly repealing discriminatory laws-and would
take a stronger stand against sex discrimination than courts ap-
peared willing to take of their own initiative." Ultimately, propo-
nents of the ERA viewed it as a step toward the complete legal and
social equality of men and women.'" The available documents how-
ever fail to address the more difficult question of what standard of
review'" the courts should follow in implementing the new state
amendment. Legislative history of the proposed federal equal rights
amendment was referred to as a source of information for defining
the actual legal meaning of such an amendment.' 7
Most importantly, the Pennsylvania ERA was part of a larger
strategy to gain passage of a federal amendment.'" Although the
Pennsylvania amendment cannot be termed a mere afterthought,
its supporters apparently realized that their goals would remain
unattained until the federal constitution was amended. Paradoxi-
cally, the success at the state level eventually was offered in opposi-
tion to ratification of the federal amendment. Members of the legis-
lature and others expressed the opinion that Pennsylvania women,
who were guaranteed equal rights under the state constitution, had
no stake in a further federal guarantee.'9 The ERA supporters re-
14. EAST REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
15. NOW REPORT, supra note 10, at 3, stated:
When women have achieved true and complete legal and social equality with men, the
problem of men and women's knowing who or what they are will probably disap-
pear . ..
To that end . . . the proposed Equal Rights for Men and Women Amendment to
the Pennsylvania Constitution, has been introduced in the General Assembly.
Cf. Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. 182, 186-88, 303 A.2d 843, 846-47 (1973) (Spauld-
ing, J., dissenting), rev'd, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974) (force of ERA not limited to political,
educational and economic equality but extended to area of domestic relations).
16. See text accompanying notes 221-26 infra.
17. EAST REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
18. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, May 5, 1971, at 46, col. 1. The EAST REPORT, supra
note 10, was actually addressed to the effect of an ERA on federal and state law.
19. See Witter Testimony, supra note 5 stating: "Recently, a few women have suggested
that women in Pa. [sicl have enough rights under the Pa. Constitution, that perhaps we
don't need the Federal Amendment." See also 1 PA. LEGIS. J., 156th Sess. 1689 (1972) (Sen-
ate) (remarks of Senator Hawbaker):
Pennsylvania's Constitution has already been amended to guarantee equal rights. I
voted for the bill that brought about this amendment. I would hasten to add, however,
that I voted for a bill to submit to the people of this Commonwealth the right to decide
for themselves whether their Constitution should be amended in this regard. What we
are doing here today is a great deal different. We are saying to the people of the
Comments
sponded by reaffirming their original goal,'" implying that recogni-
tion of sexual equality solely at the state level was ultimately unsa-
tisfactory, and that only a guarantee of national scope would perfect
the rights at stake. Eventually, on September 26, 1972, Pennsyl-
vania, the first state to add an equal rights amendment to its state
constitution, became the twenty-first state to ratify the federal
amendment.
III. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
A. Sentencing
State laws commonly extend disparate sentencing treatment to
men and women convicted of crimes. In Pennsylvania before 1968,
men were sentenced under a general sentencing statute which per-
mitted judges to set maximum and minimum sentences within the
statutorily prescribed maximum period.2 Women over sixteen years
of age were sentenced separately under the Muncy Act22 to an inde-
terminate period which was limited by the maximum term specified
by law for the crime involved. In effect, the different treatment
prescribed by the two statutes meant that women could not receive
a maximum sentence shorter than the statutory maximum, as could
men, and could not receive a minimum-maximum sentence." In
1968, prior to ratification of the Pennsylvania ERA, in
Commonwealth v. Daniel4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found
the Muncy Act arbitrary, discriminatory, and lacking reasonable
grounds of differences, and therefore violative of the fourteenth
amendment to the Federal Constitution .2  The court stated that
remaining states, the states that may not choose to pass this kind of legislation, "You
must do it because we say so."
Id.
20. Witter Testimony, supra note 5 stated:
Since the Pa. [sic] ERA was intended as a step toward the Federal Amendment,
the thousands of women who eventually worked for the passage and favorable referen-
dum, will never stop working and pressuring for ratification of the Federal ERA and
they achieve their original goal, namely, the Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1057 (1964).
22. Act of July 25, 1913, No. 816, § 15, [1913] Laws of Pa. 1315. The act took its name
from the State Correctional Institution at Muncy (formerly the State Industrial Home for
Women) where all adult women prisoners were incarcerated.
23. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 647, 243 A.2d 400, 402 (1968).
24. 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
25. Id. at 650, 243 A.2d at 404.
1976
Duquesne Law Review
biological, natural and practical differences between men and
women could justify some types of differing treatment. As such,
classification by sex was not per se violative of the equal protection
clause. However, the court found no reasonable difference between
male and female convicts to justify the differing sentencing treat-
ment."
The legislature promptly revised the Muncy Act. The new statute
prohibited imposition of minimum sentences for women offenders
but allowed judges to use their discretion in setting a maximum
sentence within the statutorily prescribed maximum period." This
sentencing scheme came under attack in 1974 in Commonwealth v.
Butler." Ronald Butler, convicted of second degree murder, charged
on appeal that, insofar as the Muncy Act required trial courts not
to impose minimum sentences on women offenders, the joint opera-
tion of the general sentencing statute and the Muncy Act was un-
constitutional.2 The court agreed and held the new act unconstitu-
tional under the Pennsylvania equal rights amendment and the
fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution." At the heart
of the issue in Butler was the fact that minimum sentences affect
parole eligibility. Prisoners under a minimum sentence are eligible
for parole upon the expiration of that minimum period." Female
offenders, not subject to a minimum sentence, were eligible for pa-
role immediately.2 Denying male offenders the opportunity for
immediate parole was discriminatory sex-based treatment which
the ERA was intended to end.3
The court's constitutional analysis in Butler had three facets: (1)
the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibited use of sex as an exclusive
classifying tool; (2) parole was a "fundamental" state policy; and
26. Id. at 649-50, 243 A.2d at 403-04.
27. Act of July 16, 1968, No. 171, § 1, [19681 Laws of Pa. 349. See also Young, When
Should the Judge State a Minimum Sentence?, 44 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 551 (1973) (review of then-
existing sentencing statutes).
28. 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974).
29. Id. at 290, 328 A.2d at 852.
30. Id. at 302-03, 328 A.2d at 859. Butler's judgment of sentence was affirmed, however,
because the general statute under which he was sentenced was completely neutral on its face.
Id. at 303, 328 A.2d at 859.
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21 (1964).
32. 458 Pa. at 295, 328 A.2d at 855. However it appears that it was common practice to
wait one year before granting women parole. Commonwealth v. Hampton, 19 Chest. Co. Rep.
291, 292 (Pa. C.P.), aff 'd mem., 219 Pa. Super. 760, 281 A.2d 341 (1971).
33. 458 Pa. at 296-98, 328 A.2d at 855-57.
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(3) there was no rational basis for predicating parole eligibility on
sex.34 Thus notwithstanding their reliance on the ERA the Butler
court apparently felt it necessary to support its conclusion with the
supplemental holding that the sentencing scheme denied equal pro-
tection under the Federal Constitution." Butler found the court
unready to rely solely on the Pennsylvania ERA to prohibit sex-
based classification.
After Butler, the Muncy Act was again amended to delete the
language prohibiting minimum sentences for women .3 Thus, at
least with regard to the setting of minimum and maximum sen-
tences and eligibility for parole, women offenders are covered by
the general state sentencing statute .3  Although under the former
statutory scheme, no parole standards for women existed,38 pre-
sumably women and men are now eligible for parole on equal
terms .31
B. Prisons and Reformatories
1. Adult Prisoners
The State Correctional Institution at Muncy, Pennsylvania, was
from its establishment the only state facility authorized to receive
female prisoners."° This could be contrasted to the treatment of
male prisoners, who could be assigned to one of several state institu-
tions, presumably affording males a greater chance of being closer
to their families, as well as being exposed to a larger variety of
rehabilitation programs." In Pennsylvania, isolation of women pris-
oners who must be sentenced to Muncy may eventually be alle-
viated by a recently enacted statute which establishes regional
34. Id.
35. Id. at 296, 328 A.2d at 855, citing Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
See Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 965-66 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Browni.
36. Act of Dec. 30, 1974, No. 345, § 2(a), [19741 Laws of Pa. 932, repealing in part PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 566 (Supp. 1976).
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1057 (1964).
38. STATUTORY REVIEW PROJECT, supra note 3, at 3.
39. Such facial equality however will not obviate the "chivalry" factor which may result
in more lenient treatment for women than for men. A. BINGAMAN, A COMMENTARY ON THE
EFFECT OF THE EQUAL RIGHTs AMENDMENT ON STATE LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS 57 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as BINGAMAN].
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, §§ 561-79 (Supp. 1976).
41. STATUTORY REVIEW PROJECT, supra note 3, at 3. See also BINGAMAN, supra note 39, at
70-73.
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treatment centers for women throughout the state." The statute
allows commitment of adult women offenders, among others, to the
centers.43 Because the act establishes geographically dispersed facil-
ities and provides for rehabilitation programs, it should" cure some
of the major nonfacial inequities of a sex-classified prison system.
It does nothing however to resolve the problem of physical segrega-
tion. Arguably the Pennsylvania ERA would invalidate the statu-
tory requirement of separate systems for male and female prison-
ers, 4 5 although the constitutionality of the dual system has not been
litigated. The issues raised are complex and involve the collision of
the ERA with other constitutional guarantees, such as the right to
privacy" and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment."
2. Juveniles.
The assignment of male and female juveniles to facilities for de-
linquents did surface as a sex discrimination issue in one case. In
re Haas" questioned a lower court's authority to assign a delinquent
female to Muncy and to require the superintendent to accept her
and provide a separate facility which would meet the requirements
of the Juvenile Act. 9 Because the superior court disposed of the case
on other grounds"0 it did not reach the constitutional questions
raised by the trial court.5 The judge below had suggested that
because male juvenile delinquents could be committed to the State
Correctional Institution at Camp Hill and kept separately from
adult offenders incarcerated there, female juveniles could be com-
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, §§ 460.11-.17 (Supp. 1976).
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 460.14(1) (Supp. 1976).
44. The major difficulty appears to be obtaining funds to establish centers. The legisla-
ture, in 4 years, has yet to appropriate money for this purpose.
45. Cf. BINGAMAN, supra note 39, at 66-67.
46. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. U.S. CONSI. amend. VIII. Women imprisoned with a large number of men might claim
an eighth amendment right to protection from physical danger. BINGAMAN, supra note 39, at
69. See also Note, The Sexual Segregation of American Prisons, 82 YALE L.J. 1229 (1973).
48. 234 Pa. Super. 422, 339 A.2d 98 (1975).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-101 to -337 (Supp. 1976). See especially id. § 50-322.
50. It found that the lower court had not considered all possible alternative facilities
before assigning Haas to Muncy. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-322 (Supp. 1976). 234 Pa.
Super. at 431, 339 A.2d at 102-03.
51. 234 Pa. Super. at 428-29 n.2 & 433 n.6, 339 A.2d at 101 n.2 & 103 n.6.
52. In re Haas, Civil Docket No. J-1918 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. 1972).
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mitted to a separate facility at Muncy. Failure to allow such a
procedure apparently would constitute disparate treatment in viola-
tion of the Pennsylvania ERA.53 The superior court answered by
noting that the system of confinement of juveniles was being re-
viewed by the Pennsylvania Attorney General and since male juve-
niles more often commit violent crimes, Camp Hill was not an inap-
propriate detention facility for males."
The marginal discussion of the ERA in Haas was only a small
facet of the court's attempt to grapple with what appeared to be the
general inadequacy of the state's juvenile detention facilities. But,
even though Haas did not face or resolve an issue of sex discrimina-
tion, the case did intimate that criteria for delinquency may be
different for male and female juveniles. The superior court noted
that males are detained for violent crimes more often than females.
While males may have committed a disproportionately higher per-
centage of violent crimes, it should be understood that the standard
of conduct applied to girls might be stricter than that applied to
boys. For example, girls might be detained for sexual misconduct
which would not subject boys to detention." The application of the
juvenile delinquency statutes thus presents potential Pennsylvania
ERA problems.
3. Criminal Justice System Personnel
The Pennsylvania Parole Law prohibits assignment of a parole
officer to a parolee of the opposite sex.5" Since male offenders and
parolees far outnumber female offenders and parolees, the number
of women permitted to be hired as parole officers is severely circum-
scribed. The Pennsylvania Attorney General has issued an opinion57
terming the limitation unenforceable and superseded by both the
Pennsylvania ERA and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.5"
53. 234 Pa. Super. at 428-29 n.2, 339 A.2d at 101 n.2.
54. Id.
55. See BINGAMAN, supra note 39, at 61-66.
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.28 (1964) states:
The board [of parole] shall appoint and employ a sufficient number of women as
parole officers and supervisors to act as such for the women over whom it shall have
power and jurisdiction, and no person of one sex shall be paroled in charge of a parole
officer of the opposite sex.
57. 1972 OP. PA. Arr'Y GEN. 150.
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1976). See especially id.
§ 955.
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Although employment of prison guards would appear to be subject
to the same analysis, no case has arisen presenting the point.
C. Laws Relating to Sexual Assault
ERA proponents and commentators have identified numerous
provisions of state criminal laws concerning sexual assault which
would be invalidated by the amendment. 5 Chief among these provi-
sions are the definition of rape as requiring "penetration of the
vagina by the penis,"I" differing punishments for rape and forcible
sodomy,6 ' and provisions regarding statutory rape of females and
seduction of males.62 The Pennsylvania rape statutes arguably de-
fine the act in such a manner as to preclude conviction of a woman
for rape, " although a court may choose to interpret the statute so
as to preserve its constitutionality. On the other hand, because rape
and forcible sodomy are both classified as first degree felonies in
Pennsylvania, "' punishment is identical for the two crimes. 5 A vio-
lation of the statutory rape provisions is a felony in the second
degree, " while sodomy with minor males is punishable as a first
degree felony. "7 This last instance may be invalid under the Pennsyl-
vania ERA for imposing different penalties for what is essentially
59. See BINGAMAN, supra note 39, at 85-98; Brown, supra note 35, at 955-60.
60. BINGAMAN, supra note 39, at 85.
61. Id. at 86-87.
62. Id. at 87-88.
63. PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3121 (1973) provides: "A person commits a felony of
the first degree when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person not his spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion ...." PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3101 (1973) provides in
part: "'Sexual intercourse.' In addition to its ordinary meaning, includes intercourse per os
or per anus, with some penetration however slight .... " The statutory language seems to
imply that penetration of the victim must occur. But see Statutory Construction Act of 1972,
PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1902 (Supp. 1976): "words used in the masculine gender shall
include the feminine and neuter."
64. See note 63 supra. See also PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3123 (1973): "A person
commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with
another person."
65. Id. § 1103: "A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to impris-
onment as follows: (1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term which shall be
fixed by the court at not more than 20 years."
66. Id. § 3122, as amended, Act of May 18, 1976, No. 53, § 1, [1976] Laws of Pa. 89: "A
person who is 18 years of age or older commits statutory rape, a felony of the second degree,
when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person not his spouse who is less than 14
years of age."
67. PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3123 (1973): "A person commits a felony of the first
degree when he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person: . . .(5) who is
less than 16 years of age."
Vol. 14: 683
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the same offense simply on the basis of the sex of the victim. The
legislature, as yet, has not undertaken to revise the sexual assault
laws in light of the amendment.6 "
D. Other Criminal Rules
The supreme court in Commonwealth v. Staub"9 invalidated the
state's fornication and bastardy statutes0 which had imposed differ-
ent penalties on men and women for producing an illegitimate child.
These statutes subjected both parents to a one hundred dollar fine,
but only the father was responsible for birth expenses, funeral costs,
and security for the child's maintenance. In Staub because the ap-
pellant objected only on the basis of the fourteenth amendment, the
court professed not to consider the case in light of the Pennsylvania
ERA, and held the statute unconstitutional because not reasonably
related to a state interest.7 However, since Staub was argued jointly
with two ERA appeals" ERA analysis unavoidably affected the de-
cision. The Staub court relied on ERA decisions in Commonwealth
v. Butler73 and Conway v. Dana.74 A version of the reciprocal rights
test found in support cases 5 appeared, although the court rejected
68. Some statutory changes, however, have been made which may be termed desirable
reforms rather than elimination of impermissible sex-based classifications. See BINGAMAN,
supra note 39, at 89-98. In 1973, the legislature repealed a statute which required juries in
sexual offense cases to be instructed to evaluate the complainant's testimony with special
care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining
the truth in such cases. Act of Nov. 21, 1973, No. 115, § 2, 119731 Laws of Pa. 339, repealing
PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3106 (1973). Recent legislation revised the crimes code inter
alia to limit use of evidence of prior sexual conduct by the victim, to ensure that the testimony
of a victim of sexual assault is given the same credibility as other witnesses' testimony and
to make clear that resistance by the victim is not required. Act of May 18, 1976, No. 53, § 1,
119761 Laws of Pa. 89, amending PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. §§ 3106-07 (1973). An earlier
version of the bill would have revised the code to the extent of defining all sexual assault in
terms which would satisfy ERA objections to the present statute. Pa. House Bill 580, Printer's
No. 649 (Mar. 3, 1975). The bill provided: "(a) A person is guilty of criminal sexual assault
in the first degree if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person . Id.
§ 3141 (emphasis added).
69. 461 Pa. 486, 337 A.2d 258 (1975).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4506 (1963), repealed, PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4323
(1973) (a similar statute which appears to apply to both parents equally).
71. 461 Pa. 490-91, 337 A.2d at 260-61.
72. Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973), revd on other grounds,
461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d 256 (1975); Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. 182, 303 A.2d 843
(1973), rev'd, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974); see section IV, DOMESTIc RELATIONS, infra.
73. 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974). See text accompanying notes 28-35 supra.
74. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974). See text accompanying notes 129-32 infra.
75. See text accompanying notes 113-24 infra.
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the argument that another statute's76 requirement that a mother
support her illegitimate child obviated any inequality in the fornica-
tion and bastardy statute.
In Commonwealth v. Santiago77 the supreme court repudiated the
common law doctrine of coverture, or coercion of the wife by the
husband.7 1 Here, the defendant claimed that this doctrine applied
to raise a rebuttable presumption that she had not participated
volitionally in the drug offenses with which she and her husband
were charged.9 The court found this doctrine outmoded and dis-
credited, and pointed to the requirements of the Pennsylvania equal
rights amendment.' " It generally criticized coverture as a legal fic-
tion having no basis in fact and rejected the defendant's assertion
that she had not acted independently of her spouse.
IV. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
A. Divorce from Bed and Board and Alimony Pendente Lite
The first spate of cases decided by the courts under the Pennsyl-
vania equal rights amendment involved challenges to statutes
which obligated men to pay support or alimony pendente lite to
their wives or former wives. The lower courts responded with diverg-
ing views on the effect of the amendment on family law. Such differ-
ing reactions make clear both that legislative intent was not force-
fully conveyed to the judiciary and that not all were readily inclined
to accept the clear (though not chaotic) change the ERA has worked
in Pennsylvania domestic relations law.
Divorce from bed and board was an anachronism of a legal system
which balked at the recognition of absolute divorce from the bonds
of matrimony; the divorce a mensa et thoro was equivalent to a
judicial separation and did not officially dissolve the marriage.8 By
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (1968) compels specified relatives, including a mother,
to contribute to the support of an indigent person.
77. 462 Pa. 216, 340 A.2d 440 (1975).
78. Id. at 225, 340 A.2d at 445.
79. Id.
Historically, a married woman committing a crime in her husband's presence, created
a rebuttable presumption that the wife was an unwilling participant. The concept of
coverture originated with the common law fiction of a unity of husband and wife.
Id. (citation omitted).
80. Id.
81. See Corso v. Corso, 120 Pitt. L.J. 183, 184-87 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. 1972) (outlines the
history of divorce from bed and board).
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statute, a wife in Pennsylvania could obtain a divorce from bed and
board on grounds such as adultery, life-endangering treatment, and
intolerable indignities. 2 The court could then order payment by the
husband of permanent alimony (not available in absolute divorces),
this order being enforceable by attachment and imprisonment. 3
Apart from alimony awarded for support of an insane spouse,84 the
only other form of alimony available in Pennsylvania was alimony
pendente lite, coupled with counsel fees and expenses.' 5 The ali-
mony pendente lite statute permitted only the wife to recover these
amounts.
In Corso v. Corso" the trial court reviewed at length the purpose
and legislative history of the federal ERA7 as a prelude to considera-
tion of a constitutional challenge to the statute allowing divorce
from bed and board. The opinion emphasized a trend in marriage
and divorce law to treat the spouses equally and as individuals.8
With little more rationale, the court concluded that the statute was
unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania ERA.88 On the same day
the same court decided Kehl v. Kehl,10 finding the statutory provi-
sion for alimony pendente lite unconstitutional for the reasons given
in Corso.'
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (1955) provided:
Upon complaint, and due proof thereof, it shall be lawful for a wife to obtain a
divorce from bed and board, whenever it shall be judged . . . that her husband has:
(a) Maliciously abandoned his family; or
(b) Maliciously turned her out of doors; or
(c) By cruel and barbarous treatment endangered her life; or
(d) Offered such indignities to her person as to render her condition intolerable and
life burdensome; or
(e) Committed adultery.
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 47 (1955). See also 78 DICK. L. REV. 402, 406 (1974).
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 45 (1955).
85. Id. § 46.
86. 120 Pitt. L.J. 183 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. 1972).
87. Id. at 189-96.
88. Id. at 187.
89. Id. at 200. See also id. at 188 where the court stated:
It thus appears that [the ERA] abolished the matter of the substantive rights,
remedies and liabilities of women for support, and prohibits them from sharing in the
property of the husband. . ..
Apparently, the only future legal remedy for the care of an indigent wife are [sic]
the "Poor Laws" of Pennsylvania . . ..
As to the issue of sharing the husband's property see DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 459 Pa. 641,
331 A.2d 174 (1975) discussed infra at notes 140-41.
90. 120 Pitt. L.J. 296, 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 164 (C.P. Allegh. Co. 1972).
91. Id. at 296, 57 Pa. D. & C.2d at 165.
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Other lower courts were reluctant to accept the equal rights
amendment's mandate. Frank v. Frank"2 upheld divorce from bed
and board and alimony pendente lite, the court expressing the belief
that the proposed reading of the ERA would destroy the concept of
marriage. Such drastic action should properly come from a clear
expression by the legislature. 3 The court then reasoned that divorce
from bed and board was available only to women not because of
their sex but because of their duty to live with their husbands. The
marriage contract constituted a waiver by a wife of freedom to live
alone and a waiver by the husband of a right not to support any-
one.94 As such, the marriage contract was also a waiver of the rights
guaranteed by the ERA. DeRosa v. DeRosa" also rebutted a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of alimony pendente lite. There the
court read the amendment as permitting reasonable classifica-
tions-classifications linked to the "very nature" of the persons
classified." Thus the statute in question was unobjectionable be-
cause it did not provide alimony pendente lite to all women but only
to the specific class of women who were without means to defend or
maintain a divorce action. 7 The court reasoned that, since the
amendment was intended to put women on an equal footing with
men, and the alimony statute was intended to put parties to a
divorce action on an equal footing, the two were not inconsistent."
The obvious flaw in the court's logic was that the statute extended
the benefit to women who were without funds but not to men. Sex,
not financial capability, was the ultimate criterion. Since the stat-
ute assumed that all men were financially able to maintain a di-
vorce action it was exactly the type of legislation an equal rights
amendment should invalidate." Frank and DeRosa reflect judicial
inability or unwillingness to discard traditional analysis of sex dis-
92. 14 Lebanon 215, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 102 (C.P. 1973).
93. Id. at 220-22, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d at 106-08. The court also claimed that if the support
laws were really offensive to the ERA, the superior court would have raised the issue sua
sponte in two cases it had decided recently. Id. at 220-22, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d at 106-09. But
see Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d 256 (1975), rev'g 226 Pa. Super. 278, 310 A.2d
426 (1973) (on the basis that the superior court by sua sponte deciding the constitutional issue
exceeded its proper appellate function).
94. 14 Lebanon at 220, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d at 107.
95. 60 Del. Co. R. 259, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 71 (C.P. 1972).
96. Id. at 261, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d at 74.
97. Id. at 262, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d at 75-76.
98. Id. at 262-63, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d at 76-77.
99. See Brown, supra note 35, at 896-97.
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crimination claims and traditional notions of men and women as
persons and partners to marriage.""'
The appellate courts' consideration of the same statutes ended in
adoption of the results in Corso and Kehl. In Henderson v.
Henderson,"' an equally divided superior court affirmed a trial
court's order that a husband deposit security for attorney's fees and
expenses, pursuant to the alimony pendente lite statute. The three
dissenters declared that males were denied alimony pendente lite
and fees solely because of their sex; therefore the statute should
have fallen to the ERA's mandate that sex be discarded as a crite-
rion for determining legal rights. 0 Soon after Henderson, Wiegand
v. Wiegand'03 presented the issues of divorce from bed and board
.and alimony pendente lite to the superior court. The three
Henderson dissenters and the judge who did not participate in that
decision joined' 4 to reverse the lower court decision and to declare
unconstitutional the bed and board divorce and alimony pendente
lite statutes. The majority proposed a "reciprocal rights" test' °
which had been articulated first in the Henderson dissent. 0 6 Al-
though the statutes in question explicitly extended a right only to
wives, the acts would pass constitutional muster if similar rights
were otherwise given to husbands. Since no other state statute gave
a husband an action for divorce from bed and board and implicitly
permanent alimony or for alimony pendente lite, extension of these
remedies to wives was violative of the Pennsylvania equal rights
amendment. 1'0
Before this constitutional issue reached the supreme court, the
legislature amended the alimony pendente lite statute to conform
to the ERA. The words "wife," "husband," and "ex-wife" were
100. Cf. Comment, The Support Law and the Equal Rights Amendment in Pennsylvania,
77 DIcK. L. REV. 254, 255-57 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Support Laws).
101. 224 Pa. Super. 182, 303 A.2d 843 (1973), rev'd and remanded, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d
60 (1974). Accord, Murphy v. Murphy, 224 Pa. Super. 460, 303 A.2d 838 (1973); Cooper v.
Cooper, 224 Pa. Super. 344, 307 A.2d 310 (1973).
102. 224 Pa. Super at 185, 303 A.2d at 845-46 (Spaulding, J., dissenting).
103. 226 Pa. Super. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d
256 (1975).
104. 78 DICK. L. REV. 402, 407 (1974).
105. 226 Pa. Super. at 282, 310 A.2d at 428. See also 78 DICK. L. REv. 402, 407-08 (1974).
106. Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. 182, 189, 303 A.2d 843, 847 (1973) (Spauld-
ing, J., dissenting).
107. Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278, 282, 310 A.2d 426, 428 (1973).
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deleted and replaced with "spouse" and "ex-spouse."''0 Conse-
quently, the supreme court remanded the Henderson appeal for
consideration in light of the new statute.'"9 Nevertheless, the court
took the opportunity to express its view on the purpose of the Penn-
sylvania ERA and the validity of the challenged statutory scheme.
Since the amendment was intended to eliminate sex as a basis for
classification, where the law provides a support remedy for the wife,
it must provide one for the husband."' The court's opinion thus
reaffirmed the correctness and desirability of the legislature's action
in amending the statute.
The decision of the superior court in Wiegand, that the bed and
board divorce statute violated the ERA, also reached the supreme
court. I' That court reversed the decision of the superior court on the
basis that it had exceeded its authority by sua sponte considering
the constitutional issue.I" As a result there has not been a definitive
judicial statement concerning the continued validity of the statute,
although it is likely that the court would invalidate it if the question
were raised in another appeal. The legislature has not taken action
to repeal or amend the statute, which now appears to be moribund.
B. Interspousal Support
Inevitably from the maze of statutes allowing spouses to recover
support from each other"3 came a challenge under the Pennsylvania
ERA. Commonwealth ex rel. Lukens v. Lukens,"4 the leading deci-
sion, found the superior court upholding the statute allowing a wife
to recover support in a quasi-criminal action for desertion." 5 The
108. Act of June 27, 1974, No. 139, § 1, [1974] Laws of Pa. 403, amending PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 46 (1955) (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (Supp. 1976)).
109. Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974).
110. The law will not impose different benefits or different burdens upon the mem-
bers of a society based on the fact that they may be man or woman. Thus, as it is
appropriate for the law where necessary to force the man to provide for the needs of a
dependent wife, it must also provide a remedy for the man where circumstances justify
an entry of support against the wife.
Id. at 101, 327 A.2d at 62.
111. Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d 256 (1975).
112. See Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278, 280, 310 A.2d 426, 427 (1973): "Neither
of [the questions raised by the husband/appellant] is discussed here as there is an additional
[constitutional] issue which is controlling."
113. See generally Support Laws, supra note 100, at 255-63.
114. 224 Pa. Super. 227, 303 A.2d 522 (1973).
115. PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4322 (1973), formerly PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4733
(1963).
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court, in relying on its Henderson dissent, reasoned that because a
different statute created a substantial reciprocal right of support for
husbands, no discriminatory sexual classification existed."8 This
reciprocity rationale was followed by county courts in cases brought
under the civil support laws."7 However, the statute cited in these
cases merely renders specified relatives liable for the support of an
indigent person."' Whether a husband does possess a right to sup-
port substantially equivalent to the wife's is arguable."9 It may be
that because the criminal and civil support actions available to
wives are not predicated on indigency, wives may recover support
in situations where dependent husbands would not. The reciprocal
rights test in any event does not strictly comply with the Pennsyl-
vania ERA in that the test condones laws which classify on the basis
of sex.
The reciprocity test is significant not only because it represents
an attempt by the courts to reconcile the ERA with a pre-existing
statutory pattern which reflects presumptions regarding the status
of husband and wife, but also because it calms doubts about the role
the courts would assume in conforming the old law to the new. A
legislature can act expeditiously to resolve the problem posed by
these statutes (in most of the support statutes, conformity to the
ERA would demand only that the words "wife" and "husband" be
changed to "spouse"); courts have felt hesitant to go beyond con-
struction to rewrite the statutory language.'2 ° Additionally, the
courts may have feared that striking down the entire statutory
scheme for support would lead to undesirable social effects and
would endanger the family as an institution. 2' Reciprocity was a
solution to this dilemma. The court could choose "equalization" of
116. 224 Pa. Super. at 229, 303 A.2d at 523.
117. Hess v. Hess, 123 Pitt. L.J. 4 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. 1974) (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
4733 (1963) does not violate ERA because husband has right to support under PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 62, § 1973 (1968)); Norris v. Norris, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 239 (C.P. Phila. Co. 1974) (upheld
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 132 (1965)); Commonwealth ex rel. Mitzel v. Mitzel, 74 Lack. Jur.
139 (Pa. C.P. 1973) (action brought under the Civil Procedure Support Law, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 62, § 2043.31 (1968)).
118. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (1968) provides: "(a) The husband, wife, child, .
father and mother of every indigent person . . . shall, if of sufficient financial ability, care
for and maintain, or financially assist, such indigent person at such rate as the court . ..
shall order or direct."
119. See, e.g., 78 DICK. L. REv. 402, 411-12 (1974).
120. See, e.g., Corso v. Corso, 120 Pitt. L.J. 183 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. 1972).
121. 78 DICK. L. REv. 402, 412 (1974).
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the status of husbands and wives over invalidation of the statute.'
Equalization was achieved not by extending specific rights and rem-
edies to husbands but by construing the state scheme of support
laws as non-discriminatory on the whole. The reciprocal rights ap-
proach can be reconciled with strong judicial language which decries
"different benefits [and] different burdens' 2 3 if this theory of judi-
cial temperance is accepted.'
In an interesting corollary development, perhaps under the influ-
ence of the ERA, courts have begun to look more realistically at
spouses' claims for support. In White v. White,' the superior court
rejected any initial limitation on appraising a wife's earning capac-
ity when considering the reasonableness of a support order.' The
court detailed factors which should be taken into account, including
employability of women who have been off the job market for years.
This approach to an interspousal support issue, treating fairly both
the spouse paying and the spouse receiving support, is consistent
with the most equanimous interpretation of the Pennsylvania ERA.
Finally, the law has in the past presumed that a husband was
primarily responsible for a wife's necessary expenses, while not im-
posing such primary liability on a wife for the husband's compara-
ble expenses. In Albert Einstein Medical Center v. Gold, 7 an action
by the hospital against husband and wife for the husband's medical
expenses, the court held that under the Pennsylvania ERA a wife
could no longer assert lack of legal responsibility as a defense based
on the former distinction between the sexes.'
C. Child Support
Prior to the equal rights amendment, the Pennsylvania courts had
held that the primary duty to support minor children rested with
the father. The state supreme court abolished this presumption in
Conway v. Dana,'5 calling it a vestige of the past and incompatible
122. See Brown, supra note 35, at 913.
123. Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 101, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (1974).
124. Cf. Frank v. Frank, 14 Lebanon 215, 216, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 102, 103 (C.P. 1973).
125. 226 Pa. Super. 499, 313 A.2d 776 (1973).
126. Id. at 504, 313 A.2d at 780: "In the interest of fairness and with consistency in mind,
we see no reason why, in this day and age, a court must limit its inquiry to the wife's
earnings."
127. 25 Fid. Rep. 337 (Pa. C.P. Phila. Co. 1974).
128. Id. at 340.
129. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
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with present recognition of equality of the sexes.'3 ° In Conway a
father had petitioned for reduction of an order of support for his two
minor children. His take-home pay had decreased to $625 per month
while his former wife was netting $700 per month. The father
charged that because of the presumption of his primary duty to
support, adequate consideration was not given to the mother's abil-
ity to contribute.'' The court in agreeing with the petitioner rea-
soned that a child's best interests were not furthered by presuming
that the father was the best provider; both parents must be required
to discharge their support obligation in accordance with their
capacities.'32
As a result of Conway and the Pennsylvania ERA, courts are more
conscious of a need to look at the relative resource positions of both
mother and father in determining the adequacy of child support
orders.'3 In Commonwealth ex rel. Buonocore v. Buonocore 31 the
court upheld a support order of thirty dollars per week against a wife
where the minor children were residing with the husband. Although
the actual impact of the new child support rule may be undramatic
overall (since more often than not husbands earn more and will
contribute more), in individual cases the abolition of the former
presumption complies with the ERA's mandate of according equal
treatment to parents regardless of sex.
An interesting subsidiary question which has arisen with the child
support cases is whether the ERA requires mathematical equality
of contributions, measured by either dollar amounts or percentages.
Theoretically, it should not, since a law may define support obliga-
tions functionally, taking into consideration current resources, earn-
ing power and non-monetary contributions of both spouses.'3 In one
130. Id. at 539, 318 A.2d at 326.
131. Id. at 539, 318 A.2d at 325-26.
132. Id. at 540, 318 A.2d at 326.
133. See Kaper v. Kaper, 227 Pa. Super. 377, 323 A.2d 222 (1974) (remanding to trial court
to consider support order in light of ERA, and mother's income and needs relevant); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Evans v. Evans, 61 Del. Co. R. 649 (Pa. C.P. 1974) (rejecting claim that
ERA demands 50-50 split of child support between father and mother); Sperry v. Sperry, 29
Som. L.J. 228, 231 (Pa. C.P. 1974) (stating that the ERA's rule of equality is imposed upon
all duties and benefits of marriage and parenthood, in accordance with the resources and
talents of the parties). Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Travitzky v. Travitzky, 230 Pa. Super. 435,
326 A.2d 883 (1974) (ERA does not require that earnings of father's second wife be considered
part of his income in determining amount of support for children by first wife-only proper
relevant inquiry is what portion of second family's budget is contributed by second wife).
134. 235 Pa. Super. 66, 340 A.2d 579 (1975).
135. Brown, supra note 35, at 946.
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Pennsylvania case, the father claimed that the equal rights amend-
ment limited his obligation to one half of the amount needed to
support his child. 3 ' The court rejected this argument, saying that
it ignored individual capacities, actual relative incomes, and non-
monetary contributions of the custodial parent.'37 On the whole, the
support cases have begun to reflect this concern for functional
rather than mathematical equality.'38
D. Marital Property and Decedents' Estates
Property law probably presents the largest number of statutes
and rules which are constitutionally suspect under the ERA.'39 Yet
the decisions have raised only a few of the issues, and even fewer
areas have been subjected to legislative scrutiny. The two leading
decisions have invalidated common law presumptions which were
based on a traditional belief of the husband's dominant position in
a marriage.
In DiFlorido v. DiFlorido'10 a wife sought to recover certain per-
sonal property and household goods which she and her husband had
accumulated prior to and during marriage. The trial judge ordered
the husband to pay one half of the appraised value of the household
goods to the wife. On appeal the husband contended that as sole
provider during marriage he was presumed the owner of all goods
in the spouses' joint possession. The supreme court did not agree.
It found the presumption of funding by the husband to be an anti-
quated offshoot of former notions of the wife's property rights. Even
an alternative rule based on actual proof of funding was unaccepta-
ble under the ERA, since it would not account for equally important
non-monetary contributions. Accordingly the court ruled that in
future cases regarding ownership of household goods, the presump-
tion would be that property acquired in anticipation of, or during
marriage, and possessed and used by both spouses, is held as entire-
136. Commonwealth ex rel. Evans v. Evans, 61 Del. Co. R. 649 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
137. Id. at 651-52.
138. See White v. White, 226 Pa. Super. 499, 313 A.2d 776 (1973), discussed in text
accompanying notes 125-26 supra; Sperry v. Sperry, 29 Som. L.J. 228, 232 (Pa. C.P. 1974)
("equality of obligation of spouses to support themselves and their children does not necessar-
ily mean equality of monetary contributions"). Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Lukens v. Lukens,
224 Pa. Super. 227, 303 A.2d 522 (1973).
139. See STATUTORY REVIEW PROJECT, supra note 3, at 5.
140. 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 174 (1975).
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ties property.'4 ' DiFlorido is thus consistent with the spouse and
child support cases which adopted a realistic view of the nature and
extent of contributions made by the two members of the marital
community.
Another common law presumption recently abrogated by the su-
preme court concerned interspousal gifts. Formerly, when a wife
obtained an interest in her husband's property (for example, where
the husband placed property into a tenancy by the entirety) a fac-
tual presumption arose that a gift had been made to the wife." 2 On
the contrary, if a husband similarly received an interest in his wife's
property, there was a presumption of a constructive trust in the
wife's favor.' The rules were based on the assumption that the
husband was dominant in the marriage, and the wife was to be
protected against undue influence by him. Butler v. Butler"' found
this one-sided presumption inconsistent with the ERA. The court
ruled that after Butler, gifts made by either spouse to the other
would be presumed entireties property; a constructive trust would
be imposed only where one spouse was shown in fact to have influ-
enced the other unfairly.'45
141. Id. at 648-51, 331 A.2d at 178-80.
142. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 224 A.2d 164 (1966).
143. See, e.g., DeBernard v. DeBernard, 384 Pa. 194, 120 A.2d 176 (1956). PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 68, § 501 (1965) provides that upon divorce property held by husband and wife as tenants
by the entireties shall be held by them as tenants in common.
144. 347 A.2d 477 (Pa. 1975).
The remedy of a constructive trust is available when the confidential relationship of mar-
riage is abused by a spouse who through fraud or undue influence causes the other to make a
gift to the entireties. Id. at 479. The two presumptions described in the text above were used
to determine when such an abuse of the confidential relationship occurred. The presumptions
probably rest on a notion that men are more knowledgeable in and likely to dominate property
and business transactions.
145. Id. at 480-81. See Hakes v. Hakes, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 25 (C.P. Sull. Co. 1974). In
Hakes, a husband sued his wife for one-half the property she had bought with an inheritance
from her first husband. The plaintiff claimed the wife was dominant in their relationship,
had refused to take the property in both names as she had promised, and therefore had
overreached him and taken undue advantage of their confidential relationship. The court
found no confidential relationship on the facts, and appeared to discard the presumptions of
gift and constructive trust. 67 Pa. D. & C.2d at 31. After noting the effect of the ERA on
"familiar and comfortable shibboleths," the court in Hakes said:
[TIhe most favorable reading of [the old rules] . . . would place the present parties
in an equal posture. At best, it appears to this court, that a wife may not now be
considered as a perpetual donee. This application of the cited rules is preferable to
reducing both parties to the status of dominated marital partners so as to allow plain-
tiff, in this case, to "rest" his case after proving the marriage alone.
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One of the few ERA decisions to date concerning decedents' es-
tates found an inheritance tax statute, 4 ' which has since been re-
pealed, unconstitutional.'47 The act, which was in effect at the testa-
tor's death in 1953, classified decedents' daughters-in-law, but not
sons-in-law, as lineal descendants. Since lineals paid a two percent
inheritance tax while collaterals, including sons-in-law, paid a fif-
teen percent tax, the court found the classification violative of the
ERA. The statute in question had been repealed in 1961,1'1 and the
present statute does not suffer from the same infirmity.
Two county courts have faced challenges to the Pennsylvania rule
which stated that a surviving husband was primarily liable for his
wife's funeral expenses and expenses incident to her last illness,
even though she had a separate estate, and, where the husband
elected to take against the will, even though the will directed pay-
ment of the expenses. In Rollman Estate'49 and Rush Estate' the
courts held the rule unconstitutional under the ERA as incompati-
ble with the amendment's anti-discriminatory intent 5' and inval-
idly presuming that a surviving husband was better able to bear the
financial burdens in question.'52
Two of the most obvious existing examples of classification by sex
in the estate laws are the statutes governing forfeiture of the
spouse's share in the intestate estate,' 53 and forfeiture of the right
to elect against the will of a spouse dying testate.'54 A husband
forfeits his share or his right to elect if he neglects or refuses to
provide for his wife, or willfully and maliciously deserts her for a
year before her death. A wife forfeits these rights only if she deserts
her husband for a year before his death. Given the recent develop-
ments in the support law, the statutes are clearly unconstitutional,
and should be conformed to the ERA.
Revision of several statutes allowing a married woman in certain
circumstances to act as a feme sole is also in order. One such stat-
ute55 allows a wife, following nonsupport or separation, to be de-
146. Act of June 20, 1919, No. 258, art. I, § 2, [1919] Laws of Pa. 521.
147. Englund Estate, 25 Fid. Rep. 341 (Pa. C.P. Phila. Co. 1975).
148. Act of June 15, 1961, No. 207, art. XII, § 1201, [1961] Laws of Pa. 373.
149. 71 Pa. D. & C.2d 6, 25 Fid. Rep. 633 (C.P. Lane. Co. 1975).
150. 26 Fid. Rep. 212 (Pa. C.P. Northam. Co. 1976).
151. Rollman Estate, 71 Pa. D. & C.2d 6, 11, 25 Fid. Rep. 633, 637 (C.P. Lanc. Co. 1975).
152. Rush Estate, 26 Fid. Rep. 212, 215 (Pa. C.P. Northam. Co. 1976).
153. PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2106 (1975).
154. Id. § 2509.
155. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 44 (1965). The constitutionality of this statute was raised
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clared a feme sole trader and to dispose of property during life, by
will, or by intestacy as if her husband were dead. Another statute'",
permits a deserted or abandoned wife to sue her husband or to
testify against him as a feme sole. A bill making the latter statutes
applicable to both spouses was introduced in 1975 but has not yet
passed the legislature.'57
E. Consortium
While Pennsylvania has long recognized a husband's right to sue
for loss of consortium, as recently as 1960, in Neuberg v.
Bobowicz, 55 the supreme court definitively refused to extend this
cause of action to wives. The court reasoned that although the cause
of action for loss of consortium was vague, outmoded, and anoma-
lous, to grant the cause of action to women would not lift their status
to that of men, but would only reduce men to the status of chattels
also. 59
Following the passage of the ERA, in Hopkins v. Blanco,'" the
court overruled Neuberg and extended the cause of action to wives.
The Hopkins court approached the issue by questioning whether the
cause of action for a husband was still viable, concluding that it
was.'6 ' Consequently, the court felt obligated to extend the cause of
action to women, in light of the ERA.' The amendment therefore
had the corrollary effect of reaffirming the desirability of the action
for consortium. The Neuberg court, although expressing dislike for
the action, did not strike it down. Hopkins, while revitalizing the
consortium action, redefined it to eliminate any assumption that
the legally recognized functions and obligations of spouses were not
identical.'
in Commonwealth ex rel. Arslanian v. Arslanian, 61 Del. Co. R. 67, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 618
(C.P. 1974), although the court did not reach the question.
156. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 114 (1965).
157. Pa. House Bill 256, Printer's No. 279 (Feb. 5, 1975).
158. 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960).
159. Id. at 154-55, 162 A.2d at 666, quoting Mlynek v. Yarnall, 28 Leh. L.J.\341, 19 Pa.
D. & C.2d 333 (C.P. 1959).
160. 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974).
161. Id. at 94, 320 A.2d at 141.
162. Id. at 93, 320 A.2d at 140.
163. See Brown, supra note 35, at 944:
[Tihe Equal Rights Amendment would prohibit enforcement of the sex-based defini-
tions of conjugal function, on which the discriminatory consortium laws are based.
Courts would not be able to assume for any purpose that women had a legal obligation
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F. Married Women's Names
The Pennsylvania Attorney General has issued several opinions
ruling that under the equal rights amendment a married woman
may retain her birth name. In a 1973 opinion dealing specifically
with the name to be used under the Vehicle Code for an operator's
license or vehicle registration,' 4 the Attorney General concluded
that the Vehicle Code required only that a person use his or her
"actual" name.' 5 This could mean a birth name or marriage name,
as long as it was consistently used. In any event, the Attorney Gen-
eral noted that neither the common law of Pennsylvania nor any
statutory authority required a woman to choose one name over an-
other.' 6 The equal rights amendment also required this conclusion,
for denying a woman the freedom to keep her birth name while
routinely allowing this right to men would be an impermissible im-
pediment based on sex.' 7
V. EDUCATION
Sex discrimination in education was the subject of one ERA case.
In Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Association' the commonwealth court invalidated a by-law of the
Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association (Association)
that prohibited girls from practicing or competing in interscholastic
high school sports.' 6 The Pennsylvania Justice Department brought
suit against the Association, challenging the validity of the by-law
under the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution and
under the state ERA. The Association argued that girls were gener-
to do housework, or provide affection and companionship, or be available for sexual
relations, unless men owed their wives exactly the same duties.
164. 1973 OP. PA. Arr'Y GEN. 172.
165. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 407 (1971).
166. 1973 OP. PA. ATr'y GEN. 172.
167. Another opinion extended the Attorney General's finding to an election statute, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 623-20(c), 951-18(c) (1963), requiring use of the "surname." 1973 Op.
PA. Arr'v GE. 209. Later these new rulings were made applicable for purposes of licensure
to all boards and commissions under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Professional and
Occupational Affairs. 1974 OP. PA. Arr'Y GEN. 28.
168. 18 Pa. Commw. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975).
169. The Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association was a voluntary unincorpor-
ated association of most public senior high schools. Id. at 48, 334 A.2d at 840. The by-law in
question provided: "Girls shall not compete or practice against boys in any athletic contest."
Id. citing PIAA BY-LAWs art. XIX, § 3B.
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ally weaker and more injury-prone than boys. These physical differ-
ences necessitated the exlusion of girls from competition with boys,
and since a separate system of all girl teams existed, female stu-
dents suffered no denial of equal opportunity. The court however,
while declining to consider the federal question, found the by-law
facially unconstitutional under the ERA, 70 in that it denied girls
equality under the law 7' solely because of sex. The court felt that
although girls could constitutionally be excluded from participation
in athletic competition because of individual weakness or lack of
skill, any generalized classifications based on sex violated the ERA.
Finally, as if to underscore the breadth of its decision, the court held
that its order would apply also to football and wrestling, two sports
the Commonwealth had specifically exempted from its complaint.'
Before argument and decision of the PIAA case, the State Board
of Education (Board) had acted to prevent sex discrimination in
scholastic athletics under its control. The Board amended its regu-
lations governing the physical education curriculum 7 3 to require,
first, that intramural athletic programs provide boys and girls with
equal access to facilities, equipment, and funding appropriate to the
sport. "'74 Secondly, in the area of interscholastic activities, school
districts must not exclude girls from existing boys' teams, and must
provide separate programs to boys and girls, with equal access to
equipment, facilities, coaching and funding."5 These regulations
attempt to cure past, and prevent future inequality in athletic pro-
gramming by requiring an overall program which permits girls to
compete at every skill level, whether their competitors be male or
female. 7 ' The regulations are consistent with PIAA' 7" in that they
170. 18 Pa. Commw. at 49, 334 A.2d at 841. See generally 14 DuQ. L. REv. 101 (1975).
171. The Association's functions had been found previously to be state action. Thus, the
court said the mandate of the ERA was applicable. 18 Pa. Commw. at 51, 334 A.2d at 842.
172. Id. at 48 n.2, 53, 334 A.2d at 841 n.2, 843.
173. 22 PA. CODE § 5.25 (1974).
174. Id. § 5.25(d).
175. Id. §§ 5.25(e)(2)-(4).
176. See 4 PA. BULL. 2171 (1974):
The Board was especially concerned with devising a formula that would assure equal
opportunity in athletics for members of both sexes in light of overwhelming evidence
of inadequate programming for girls in many areas and in light of the mandate of the
people of Pennsylvania as expressed in Article I, § 28, of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion. Thus, in § 5.15(e)(2) [sic; § 5.25(e)(2)], the Board has required that each school
district provide a comprehensive program of athletics to both boys and girls, taking
into account what may be the special needs and/or interests of the students. Such a
program may consist of separate teams for boys and girls in certain sports where this
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require that girls be permitted to compete with boys. 7 But they are
also designed to accommodate the fear that making participation
opportunities available only on the basis of superior skill, strength
or size could effectively exclude girls from all school sports."9 Such
a system, though facially neutral, might be unconstitutional in im-
pact.10 While recognizing that the problems in this area of educa-
tion are numerous and complex, '8' the Pennsylvania administrative
solution appears to be responsive to ERA requirements.
Sex discrimination in educational institutions within the Com-
monwealth is prohibited, independently of the Pennsylvania ERA,
by several statutory and administrative provisions. Title IX of the
Federal Civil Rights Act"2 prohibits sex discrimination in educa-
tional programs receiving federal funds. On the primary and second-
ary levels, students in Pennsylvania public schools are guaranteed
a free and full education without regard to sex.'83 Additionally, the
Fair Educational Opportunities Act'84 prohibits sex discrimination
is desirable in order to maintain or develop effective male or female participation in
athletic programs; or, as provided in § 5.25(e)(3), it may also include coeducational
teams so long as the basic concept of equal access as described in § 5.25(e)(2) is
maintained. Finally, where separate teams for boys and girls are included in the
program, girls may not be excluded solely on the grounds of sex (though they may be
on the grounds of ability (§ 5.25(e)(4)). This latter provision was included as a recogni-
tion of the present reality-i.e., that many boys' teams have, by virtue of the prefer-
ences previously accorded to them, achieved an advantage in the level of competition
and prestige in their schools. In accordance with the well-recognized principle of af-
firmative action, girls may thus attempt to develop their skills at the highest level of
competition afforded at their school.
177. The regulations appeared to be prompted by the Commonwealth's initiation of suit
against the Association.
The proposed regulations do not seek to control the activities of any private or volun-
tary organization. However, the regulations recognize interscholastic athletics as a part
of the total educational program and assert State Board authority over interscholastic
athletics. To the extent that there is any conflict between State Board regulations and
the rules of any other organization, the regulations of the State Board shall control.
4 PA. BuLL. 2171 (1974).
178. 22 PA. CODE § 5.25(e)(4) (1974): "No rules may be imposed that exclude girls from
trying out for, practicing with, and competing on boys' interscholastic teams."
179. Bingaman, supra note 39, at 124-25.
180. See, e.g., 14 DuQ. L. REv. 101, 110 n.64 (1975).
Separate-but-equal teams for boys and girls are of doubtful constitutionality under the
ERA. Bingaman, supra note 39, at 123. But see Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., 361 F. Supp.
930 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
181. Bingaman, supra note 39, at 122-30.
182. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (Supp. V, 1975).
183. 22 PA. CODE § 12.4 (1974). In addition, neither pregnancy nor marital status can
affect this right. Id. §§ 12.1(a), (c).
184. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5001-10 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1976). See also 22 PA.
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in post-secondary institutions. Such institutions, therefore, may not
discriminate on account of sex in admission or other practices. This
statute does provide an important exemption for institutions which
are not state owned, state related or state aided; such schools may
enroll members of either sex in any proportion, or exclude one sex
entirely.' 5 Because the Pennsylvania equal rights amendment does
not apply to private institutional practices, the statutory exception
may pose no constitutional infirmity.", Overall, state statutes and
regulations independently bring the Commonwealth's educational
system closely in line with ERA requirements. However, some
Pennsylvania public secondary schools retain sex-based admissions
practices. These practices contravene the ERA by perpetuating a
separate-but-equal system of high school education, and are suscep-
tible to attacks in the courts.' 7
VI. EMPLOYMENT
One commentator' 8 has concluded that a federal ERA will have
a marginal impact on employment because of the pervasive influ-
ence of Title VII.' sI Similarly, the practical effect of the Pennsyl-
vania ERA on state employment law has been, and probably will
remain, minimal. Title VII and state legislation, particularly the
Human Relations Act (HRA),'9 0 have for years prohibited sex dis-
crimination in employment practices. The HRA is applicable to
those employing four or more persons within the Commonwealth,'"
CODE §§ 32.1-.6 (1975).
185. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5004(a)1-3, (aa)1-3 (Supp. 1976).
186. Id. § 5009. The section also specifically names those schools considered to be state
owned, related or aided. But see note 201 infra.
187. Cf. Vorchheimer v. School District, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), holding that gender-
based admission requirements at two single-sex Philadelphia high schools did not offend the
equal protection clause. The district court had granted relief to the female plaintiff who
sought admission to an all male school. 400 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1975). That court however
declined to accept pendent jurisdiction over a claim under the Pennsylvania ERA, stating
that standards regarding its applicability had not been clearly established in the Pennsyl-
vania courts. 400 F. Supp. at 332-33.
188. Hillman, Sex and Employment Under the Equal Rights Amendment, 67 Nw. U.L.
REv. 789, 841 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hillman].
189. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. V, 1975).
190. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1976). See also Equal
Pay Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 336.1-10 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1976); 34 PA. CODE
§§ 9.61-.65 (1968).
191. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(b) (Supp. 1976).
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covering substantially all employers. This act was amended in 1969
to specifically include sex as an unlawful basis of discrimination.'
It is important to note also that the Human Relations Act reaches
private discrimination as well as discrimination by the Common-
wealth as an employer."3 Since the Pennsylvania ERA can reach
only action "under the laws" of the Commonwealth state action is
required to bring constitutional proscriptions into play. The effect
of the Pennsylvania ERA should be to invalidate any statutes incon-
sistent with its mandate; the HRA overlaps the ERA in this respect
also because it provides for the repeal of any law inconsistent with
its provisions.'94 The field of employment was therefore, before the
adoption of the equal rights amendment, already regulated by anti-
discrimination legislation of a scope broader than that of the ERA.
Even in instances where both the Human Relations Act and the
ERA would invalidate a sex-based classification, those interpreting
the laws may prefer to work within known statutory structures,
avoiding reliance on constitutional provisions until necessary. For
example, the state unemployment compensation statutes formerly
unlawfully discriminated against women by deeming ineligible for
unemployment benefits those who voluntarily left work because of
pregnancy.'95 In 1974, the Pennsylvania Attorney General ruled that
192. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Supp. 1976):
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice, unless based upon a bona fide occu-
pational qualification ....
(a) For any employer because of the . . . sex . . . of any individual to refuse to
hire or employ, or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual, or to
otherwise discriminate against such individual . . . if the individual is the best able
and most competent to perform the services required.
193. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(b) (Supp. 1976).
194. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(a) (1964) provides: "The provisions of this act shall be
construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof, and any law inconsistent
with any provisions hereof shall not apply."
Pennsylvania's "protective" female labor statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 101-33 (1964),
as amended (Supp. 1976), which would have been a prime target of the ERA, was held in
1969 to have been impliedly repealed by the Human Relations Act's sex amendment. Kober
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467, 471-72 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (citing unpublished
opinion of Pennsylvania Attorney General, Nov. 14, 1969). Kober also held that the women's
"protective" labor law was in conflict with Title VII insofar as it regulated hours of employ-
ment, and that under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, the federal legislation
prevailed. 325 F. Supp. at 474.
195. The statute provided, inter alia:
An employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week-
(b)(1) In which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause
of a necessitous and compelling nature . . . . Provided, That a voluntary leaving work
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the provisions in question were inconsistent with the Human Rela-
tions Act and therefore invalid,' finding it unnecessary to reach the
ERA question."7
Given the existing statutory scheme, the most interesting inquiry
in employment discrimination should be the extent to which the
ERA will modify the proscriptions of the Human Relations Act. The
bona fide occupational qualification provision (BFOQ) of the Act'90
is an exception to the Act's ban on sex discrimination intended to
be of limited scope and to apply only when business necessity de-
mands.'99 Nevertheless, on its face the BFOQ, as a state law which
permits sex discrimination, would appear to violate the ERA's ban
on discriminatory state action. °0 The question then is whether the
BFOQ and the business necessity defense should be available after
passage of the ERA.2"' Conceptually it is possible to reconcile the
two. The BFOQ test if narrowly construed should compel the same
result as an equal rights amendment. Arguably, the BFOQ contem-
plates classification based on "sex-as-sex," or sexual characteristics
as such and not stereotyped or statistically proven notions of char-
acteristics.202 Thus an employer could lawfully restrict hiring to only
one sex (1) where a physical characteristic unique to a sex is re-
quired to perform the job, as with wet nurses or sperm donors, (2)
because of pregnancy . . . shall be deemed not a cause of a necessitous and compelling
nature ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(b)(1) (1964). The statute has since been amended to remove the
offensive provisions. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(b)(1) (Supp. 1976).
196. 1974 OP. PA. Arr'v GEN. 29. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(a) (1964), note 194
supra.
197. 1974 OP. PA. Arr'v GEN. 29, 31 n.1.
It is interesting to note that the Attorney General apparently equated constitutionality
under the ERA with that under the fourteenth amendment.
198. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Supp. 1976).
199. 16 PA. CODE §§ 41.71(a)-(b) (1974).
200. See Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. Commw. 614, 618-19 n.2,
339 A.2d 850, 853 n.2 (1975): "An issue not raised here but of potential import is the effect of
the ERA upon the continued constitutional viability of the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion exemption provided by . . . the Act."
201. Cf. Hillman, supra note 188, at 828 (discussing the very similar Title VII BFOQ
defense and possible impact of an ERA). Note that the ERA's impact may extend into the
area of private discrimination on the basis that state laws regulating private discrimination,
such as Title VII and the Human Relations Act, must themselves comply with the ERA.
202. 1 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: SEX § 14.00 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
LARSON].
It is probably correct to say that under the ERA a BFOQ defense would not be available
for sex-based classifications involving non-unique physical characteristics. Hillman, supra
note 188, at 828.
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where authenticity demands it, as in casting an actress to play a
female role, or (3) where privacy or "decency" must be protected,
as in the hiring of rest room attendants.2 3 Such a definition of the
scope of the BFOQ correlates well with the requirements of the
ERA,0 4 which allows classification by unique physical characteris-
tics, and makes exception to preserve the right of privacy. 05
The soundness of this proposed analysis is supported by actual
judicial and administrative practice in applying the BFOQ. In Cerra
v. East Stroudsburg Area School District s" the supreme court found
"sex discrimination pure and simple" in a school district regulation
compelling termination of teachers' employment at the end of the
fifth month of pregnancy. The district's regulation, the court found,
singled out pregnant teachers as a class and discriminated against
them solely on the basis of sex;207 male teachers suffering from tem-
porary disabilities were not so harshly treated. °0 In so holding, the
court refused the school district's claim of a BFOQ justification. 209
Subsequent to this decision the Human Relations Commission pro-
mulgated regulations making an exclusionary employment policy or
practice based on pregnancy a prima facie violation of the HRA,
shifting the burden to the employer to demonstrate that the exclu-
sion is warranted under the limited BFOQ exception. 10 The regula-
tions formalize the requirement that pregnancy and childbirth dis-
abilities be treated as any other temporary disability .2 1
The result in Cerra probably would have been reached indepen-
dently under the Pennsylvania ERA. While under the amendment
it can be argued that pregnancy as a physical characteristic unique
to females is a valid basis for classification, 212 the soundness of such
reasoning is suspect. A more acceptable analysis is that courts must
apply standards of relevance and necessity to expose laws which
203. LARSON, supra note 202, § 14.10-.30.
204. Cf. Brown, supra note 35, at 894 (citing laws concerning wet nurses as permissible
under the ERA); LARSON, supra note 202, at § 14.10 (citing the same type of law as meeting
the BFOQ test).
205. Brown, supra note 35, at 926.
206. 450 Pa. 207, 299 A.2d 277 (1973).
207. Id. at 213, 299 A.2d at 280.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 16 PA. CODE 88 41.101-102 (1975).
211. Id. §§ 41.103-.104.
212. See Hillman, supra note 188, at 797. Cf. Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School Dist.,
450 Pa. 207, 213, 299 A.2d 277, 280 (1973) ("[pregnant women] are discharged from their
employment on the basis of a physical condition peculiar to their sex").
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evade the intent of the amendment. Such standards include the
availability of less drastic alternatives, the relationship between the
characteristic and the problem which purportedly requires the clas-
sification, and the proportion of the problems attributable to the
characteristic. Under this analysis, pregnancy must be treated as
only one type of temporary disability which has little distinct relev-
ance to job-connected concerns, such as the extent to which the
disability actually reflects upon job performance, competence, and
efficiency.214 If pregnancy is singled out from other temporary dis-
abilities the classification discriminatorily isolates the sex-linked
part of the real problem-that the employee may be unable to
work.215
Thus it can be argued that not only are the Pennsylvania equal
rights amendment and the BFOQ exception to the Human Rela-
tions Act consistent, 2  but they also apply essentially the same test
to discriminatory practices. The HRA, however, will continue to
have a more substantial impact on employment because it regulates
private employment practices where no state action is involved.
Finally, although there is no applicable case law, the amendment
has directly affected state labor laws containing sex-based exclu-
sions from occupations. The state Attorney General has issued opin-
ions on several such "protective" laws, terming them unconstitu-
tional under the ERA. Declared invalid were the section of the state
Athletic Code which barred females from being licensed as boxers
and wrestlers, 27 a child labor law prohibiting female minors from
213. Brown, supra note 35, at 894-96.
214. Cf. Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School Dist., 450 Pa. 207, 214, 299 A.2d 277, 280
(1973) (noting that problems of continuity of instruction arise from absence due to any
temporary disability).
215. Brown, supra note 35, at 932.
216. In support of this see Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa.
Commw. 614, 619 n.2, 339 A.2d 850, 853 n.2 (1975):
[Tihe key language of the ERA is the concluding phrase, "because of the sex of the
individual." This would indicate that differentiations in the employment relationship
which related to competence or "bona fide occupational qualifications" rather than the
sex of an individual would not be inconsistent with the ERA.
Note that since a BFOQ in this context admittedly is a sex-based classification, the common-
wealth court's statement above is inaccurate insofar as it can be inferred that a BFOQ is not
on its face a classification by sex, as competence is not. Perhaps implicit in the court's
conclusion is consideration of the standards of relevance and necessity which reveal whether
the classifications by sex will effectuate the purpose of the classifications by physical charac-
teristic.
217. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 30.310 (1963), deemed unconstitutional in 1973 Op. PA. Arr'v
GEN. 103.
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distributing newspapers in public places,"2 8 and provisions which
precluded female cosmetologists from fashioning men's hair. ' '
Numerous other sex-based exclusions appear in the labor laws of the
state.22 0 No litigation has triggered court decisions invalidating
them, and the legislature has not yet taken action to repeal those
statutes which have been declared unconstitutional or to effect a
systematic revision of other laws which exclude individuals from
occupations on the basis of sex.
VII. THE STANDARD OF REvIEW UNDER THE ERA
Any assessment of the Pennsylvania ERA's impact on state law
must involve an analysis of the standard of review, or standard of
equality, which the courts follow in interpreting the amendment.
Such a study is useful to show whether passage of the amendment
marks a new approach to sex discrimination claims, or merely clari-
fies and consolidates the traditional equal protection standard. In
Pennsylvania the outcome of such an analysis offers no clear-cut
results. The cases find the courts relying to a great extent on four-
teenth amendment reasoning; but it is submitted that the ERA and
its symbolic significance have led courts to invalidate sex-based
classifications with a fresh vigor.
A state constitutional provision barring sex discrimination cannot
be read in a vacuum. Because sex discrimination claims have been
decided under the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth
amendment, its judicial implementation inevitably serves as a ref-
erence point against which to measure the extent of the new amend-
ment's prohibitions. Unquestionably, support for an equal rights
amendment is largely an indication of dissatisfaction with treat-
ment of sex discrimination claims under the fourteenth amend-
ment, 222 most notably with the failure of the Supreme Court to label
sex a suspect classification. 23
218. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 48 (1964), deemed unconstitutional in 1971 OP. PA. Arr'Y
GEN. 130.
219. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 507 (1968), deemed unconstitutional in 1971 OP. PA. AT-r'Y
GEN. 126.
220. See, e.g., STATUTORY REVIEW PROJECT, supra note 3, at 4.
221. The term "standard of equality" appears in Hillman, supra note 188, passim.
222. Cf. note 11 supra. See also Dorsen & Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional
Amendment, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. Lie. L. REV. 216 (1971).
223. In 1971, the United States Supreme Court for the first time invalidated a sex-based
classification using a minimum scrutiny or reasonableness test. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
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In contrast to the divergence of opinion regarding the contours of
an equal protection standard, an equal rights amendment worded
as the Pennsylvania and proposed federal24 provisions provides a
sound basis for the argument that classifications by sex are prohib-
ited absolutely. 25 At the very least, an equal rights amendment
should mandate a strict scrutiny standard.12 If the Pennyslvania
ERA is not to be emasculated it must be interpreted to mean at
least this much, since the standard of review will determine the
ERA's ultimate significance. Unless courts make a clear choice
among the theoretically possible standards of review-minimal
scrutiny, strict scrutiny, or absolute prohibition-the ERA cannot
be used to its full potential as a weapon against sex discrimination.
A. The Absolute Standard in Theory
The history of the proposed federal ERA indicates that supporters
and congressional authorities believed the amendment's command
to be pristinely simple-any classification based on sex is impermis-
sible. 27 But this conceptualization has been criticized as inaccur-
ate,2 ' for the "absolute" standard does admit of at least two excep-
tions, and under certain circumstances requires resort to more con-
ventional constitutional analysis. The two exceptions are the right
(1971). See Bingaman, supra note 39, at 6-7. The Court has on at least one occasion come
close to adopting strict scrutiny in sex discrimination cases. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973) (four Justices would have applied the strict standard of review).
224. Compare the text of the Pennsylvania equal rights amendment quoted in text ac-
companying note 2 supra, with the proposed federal amendment: "Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied by the United States or by any State on account of sex." H.R.J.
Res. 208, § 1, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
225. See Brown, supra note 35, at 889, 892-93:
The basic principle of the Equal Rights Amendment is that sex is not a permissible
factor in determining the legal rights of women, or of men. This means that the
treatment of any person by the law may not be based upon the circumstances that such
person is of one sex or the other. . . . In short, sex is a prohibited classification ...
[Ilt follows that the constitutional mandate must be absolute. The issue under
the Equal Rights Amendment cannot be different but equal, reasonable or unreasona-
ble classification, suspect classification, fundamental interest, or the demands of ad-
ministrative expediency. Equality of rights means that sex is not a factor. This at least
is the premise of the Equal Rights Amendment.
226. Bingaman, supra note 39, at 18. This is also a permissible inference from Justice
Powell's statement in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (concurring opinion),
that passage of the Federal ERA would resolve doubt as to whether sexual classifications are
suspect.
227. See note 225 supra.
228. See Hillman, supra note 188, at 833.
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to privacy qualification and the unique physical characteristic qual-
ification. Under the former, segregation by sex in such facilities as
rest rooms, institutional sleeping quarters and dressing rooms is
permissible to protect the individual's constitutional right to pri-
vacy. 29 The second exception permits laws which classify on the
basis of physical characteristics unique to a sex-for example, wet
nurses and sperm donors could be regulated as classes. If a physical
characteristic which is present in all or some members of one sex but
not in any member of the opposite sex is the classifying basis, the
ERA would not be contravened .2 30 Thus, severely limited classifica-
tions by sex would be permissible under the ERA and an absolute
standard of review.23 1
Classifications which are facially sex-neutral but discriminatory
in impact also pose a problem under an absolutist equal rights
amendment. An example of such a classification would be regula-
tion which permitted high schools to have only one athletic team per
sport. This rule would preclude most girls from participating in
sports programs, because of their relatively small size or lack of
training.232 The spirit of the ERA would demand looking beyond the
face of the regulation, ostensibly proper under the absolute standard
of review, to determine the existence of a discriminatory effect.
This outline of the absolute standard suggests that while it is not
really absolute, it is undeniably more rigorous than any heretofore
proposed constitutional standard of sexual equality.
B. The ERA Standard in Pennsylvania
The courts of Pennyslvania in interpreting the ERA have not
expressly adopted an absolute standard of review, although the in-
229. Brown, supra note 35, at 900. The authors admit that the parameters of the right of
privacy as set by the United States Supreme Court are not clearly delineated. Id. Addition-
ally, they caution that the sex-segregated private facilities would have to be equal even
though separate. Id. at 901. But cf. id. at 902, noting that the separate-but-equal doctrine
has "no place in the Equal Rights Amendment."
230. Id. at 893.
231. The unique physical characteristic exception poses a difficult problem when preg-
nancy is the characteristic used. Pregnancy occurs only in women, and therefore laws impos-
ing different treatment on this basis would seem beyond the ERA's sanction. However, an
acceptable resolution is possible with analysis of the necessity of the classification and its
relevance to the end to be achieved. Id. at 894. As mentioned before, the ERA would require
in most cases that pregnancy be treated as any other temporary disability. See text accompa-
nying notes 210-11 supra.
232. Bingaman, supra note 39, at 33. See text accompanying notes 177-81 supra for the
Pennsylvania solution.
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terpretation process has shown glimmers of sympathy for the test.
The decisions have generally amalgamated a new constitutional
provision with fourteenth amendment analysis. Individual plaintiffs
may not quarrel with this approach since the decisions have almost
unanimously invalidated challenged statutes and rules, whatever
the constitutional test applied. But from an analytical perspective,
the major shortcoming of the Pennsylvania ERA cases is their fail-
ure to clarify the standard of review. Most importantly, the ERA's
potential will be seriously undercut if the courts fail to accept a
distinct, "absolute" standard.
The leading statements of the supreme court concerning an ERA
standard of review appear in Conway v. Dana,233 Henderson v.
Henderson,3' and Hopkins v. Blanco.23 In these cases the court
concluded that under the ERA sex was no longer a permissible
factor in the determination of legal rights and legal responsibili-
ties.2 3 This strong language is capable of supporting an absolute
test. But actual rationales of decisions of the supreme and lower
courts indicate that just as framers and proponents of the federal
ERA found it necessary to qualify the amendment's command, so,
in the course of adjudication courts have found it necessary, con-
sciously or not, to refrain from a fully "absolute" interpretation of
the Pennsylvania ERA. The significant fact is that because the
courts have not explicitly adopted a pure ERA formulation of sexual
equality, they have not defined their standard solely in ERA termi-
nology (and its very restrictive qualifications) but have done so in
the context of fourteenth amendment conventions, which may ulti-
mately lead to erosion of the ERA's mandate.
An example of a hybrid standard is found in Commonwealth v.
Butler.137 While finding a violation of the ERA, the court's language
supports the inference that it did so because the classification in
question had no rational basis, and also affected a fundamental
right, combining minimum and strict scrutiny tests. Butler then
implies that the ERA standard is redundant of the fourteenth
amendment. Whether or not exaggerated by unnecessarily confus-
ing language, this type of narrow reading of the ERA has appeared
233. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974). See text accompanying notes 129-32 supra.
234. 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974). See text accompanying notes 101-07 supra.
235. 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974). See text accompanying notes 160-63 supra.
236. See, e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 101, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (1974).
237. 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974). See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
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in other opinions, especially those of trial courts which have sanc-
tioned "reasonable" classifications.23
The most outstanding examples of reliance on fourteenth amend-
ment analysis appear in the support and divorce cases.' 9 Conway
v. Dana24 invalidated a presumption that a father was primarily
liable for support of children, but did so because the child's best
interests would not be furthered by this assumption. 21 The state-
ment rings of an equal protection conclusion that the state's purpose
would not be furthered by the differing treatment. Consequently
this rationale would allow sex-based treatment to exist, under the
ERA, if the child's interests would be furthered.
The reciprocal rights test postulated by the superior court in
Commonwealth ex rel. Lukens v. Lukens"' also applied a non-ERA
standard. The court concluded that because a husband had a recip-
rocal right to support from his wife (even though her right to support
under a number of statutes might be mathematically greater than
his) those statutes extending a support right only to the wife did not
effect arbitrary or discriminatory treatment. In terms of equal pro-
tection analysis, the court's language presumably means not that
the classifications were reasonable or justifiable for compelling rea-
sons, but that the statutes did not initially extend different treat-
ment to persons in similar circumstances. Men and women were
actually treated equally.
The reciprocity test is undoubtedly contrary to the pure theory of
the ERA. As suggested above it may have been adopted because of
a desire to avoid judicial legislation, 4 and in recognition of the
"revolutionary" effect of the ERA. Regardless of motive, even as-
suming substantial reciprocity, a highly questionable assumption,
the Lukens test is unacceptable. The concept of "substantial" legal
equality should be foreign to the Pennsylvania equal rights amend-
ment. Under the ERA, the mere fact that a statute extends a benefit
only to one sex indicates unequal and therefore unlawful treatment.
Absent categorization within an ERA exception, the statute is in-
valid. 44
238. See, e.g., DeRosa v. DeRosa, 60 Del. Co. R. 259, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 71 (C.P. 1972)
(ERA permits "reasonable" classifications).
239. See discussion at notes 86-91 and 95-100 supra.
240. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974). See text accompanying notes 129-32 supra.
241. Id. at 540, 318 A.2d at 326.
242. 224 Pa. Super. 227, 303 A.2d 522 (1973).
243. See discussion at notes 113-24 supra.
244. Note also that the concept of separate-but-equal is unacceptable under the ERA. But
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An analysis of a commonwealth court case, Percival v. City of
Philadelphia,"' also illustrates use of equal protection concepts in
attempting to define the scope of the ERA. But further, it can be
argued that it is possible to infer from the case support for a consti-
tutional standard which is distinct from strict scrutiny and rational
basis. Though clothed in conventional terms, the Percival court's
approach displays the unique impact of the ERA and can provide a
framework for explanation of a new standard of sexual equality.
A state statutory scheme exempted married women from arrest
and imprisonment on a writ of capias ad respondendum. 45 In
Percival, facing a challenge to this act, the commonwealth court
expressly raised the question of what standard of review was in-
tended under the ERA. The court concluded that the proper and
intended standard of review was a middle ground between a test of
relationship to legislative purpose, and a test which made sex, like
race, a wholly impermissible basis for classification.24 ' Because the
court's language is ambiguous the character of the Percival ERA
standard is unclear. If race, the outer limit, is a suspect classifica-
tion, then Percival proposed a standard which falls short of the
mark proposed by most commentators-that is, that the ERA de-
mands at least a test of strict scrutiny.
On the other hand, the Percival court may have used race as an
example not of a merely suspect classification, but of an absolutely
prohibited one. '48 Using this assumption, the ERA standard is less
than an absolute one, but more than an equal protection one. '49 Here
it is important to note that the court relied on a previous federal
see Comment, An Overview of the Equal Rights Amendment in Texas, 11 HOUSTON L. REV.
136, 142 (1973). The reciprocal rights test was also used in the bed and board divorce cases,
there invalidating the sex-based statute. See, e.g., Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278,
310 A.2d 426 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d 256 (1975). See also 78
DICK. L. REV. 402, 410-11, (1974).
245. 12 Pa. Commw. 628, 317 A.2d 667 (1974).
246. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 171, 255-56, 304 (1953); PA. R. Civ. P. 1481.
247. 12 Pa. Commw. at 639, 317 A.2d at 673.
248. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969),
noting that after Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), decisions and commentators
implied that the United States Supreme Court applies a per se rule to racial classifications.
82 HARv. L. REV. at 1089. This "colorblind" principle would be based on the rationale that
the state may never differentiate between persons on the basis of race. Id. at 1088-90.
249. The court explicitly stated that the statute did not meet the equal protection test:
"Does the exemption . . . deny equality of right to a non-exempt man with dependent
children because of his sex? It seems to us that it does and that the exemption, although it
passes the test of equal protection, fails that of Article I, Section 28." 12 Pa. Commw. at 639,
317 A.2d at 673. But see 14 DUQ. L. REV. 101, 109 n.55 (1975).
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court decision 50 that held the same statute valid under the strict
scrutiny test as serving a compelling state interest. It is therefore
possible to read the Percival test as falling between an absolute
standard and a strict scrutiny test. The court may have felt that the
ERA was intended to eliminate sex-based classifications, but was
unwilling to adopt a no-exception standard. Perhaps the court tac-
itly shared the apprehensions of ERA commentators that an abso-
lute standard would not leave room for exceptions protecting, for
example, the right of privacy.
But a reading of Percival which reveals a test somewhere between
strict scrutiny and absolutism is in accord with the true ERA test.
Arguably, the only conceivable standard which would be more re-
strictive than strict scrutiny but less restrictive than absolutism
would be the absolute standard subject to the limited exceptions
discussed above.2 5' Such a framework is qualified and pragmatic,
and unequivocally eliminates sex as a determining factor, avoiding
dilution of the ERA which will occur if the "discretionary weighing
of preferences" innate in strict scrutiny or reasonableness analysis
is injected into the ERA.25 2
The above analysis of Percival is admittedly speculative, but the
same court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscho-
lastic Athletic Association253 is in accord with a non-discretionary,
unequivocal ERA standard. There the court in seemingly unquali-
fied language 4 rejected a sex-based classification. Interestingly, the
court also noted that the provision in question did not fit into the
permissible ERA exception for classification by unique physical
characteristic. 55 It is arguable therefore that Percival and PIAA
together show the commonwealth court implicitly adopting a stan-
dard of review distinct to the ERA which can avoid incursions such
as the reciprocal rights test and allow the ERA to achieve its full
potential.
250. Non-Resident Taxpayers Ass'n v. Murray, 347 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd,
410 U.S. 919 (1973).
251. See text accompanying notes 228-30 supra.
252. Brown, supra note 35, at 892.
253. 18 Pa. Commw. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975). See text accompanying notes 168-72 supra.
254. But see 14 DuQ. L. REV. 101, 106 & n.37 (1975).
255. 18 Pa. Commw. at 52, 334 A.2d at 841.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The prevailing standard under the Pennsylvania ERA is not the
more desirable "absolute" or non-discretionary theory. The adop-
tion of an analysis partially redundant of fourteenth amendment
considerations is understandable given the difficulty courts have
had in discovering legislative intent and the reality that the bulk
of important ERA cases have arisen in the domestic relations area.
Consequently, the courts have had to overcome initial reluctance
to apply the equal rights amendment beyond political, educational
and economic boundaries and into the realm of the family.25 ERA
changes in the criminal justice system are not likely to trigger emo-
tional reactions or affect the number of people as will changes in the
support laws. And the areas of education and employment were
already substantially regulated by prohibitions against sex dis-
crimination prior to enactment of the ERA. Especially in the case
of Title VII and the Human Relations Act, existing statutory re-
quirements were highly compatible with ERA standards. No such
guidance or experience was available in cases dealing with intra-
family rights and duties.
Constitutional adjudication under the Pennsylvania equal rights
amendment is a piecemeal attack on sex-based classification. The
short answer to the problem of discriminatory state laws is compre-
hensive legislative revision. The courts, however, should not be re-
luctant to interpret the ERA expansively, but should accept the
requirements of the ERA in full. Once it is understood that an equal
rights amendment does not lead to disastrous social consequences,
and does not nullify other constitutional rights, acceptance will
come more easily. Perhaps if the courts recognize that social theo-
ries are already in a process of change they will realize that full
implementation of the ERA is fitting and appropriate for this mo-
ment in history.
MARGARET K. KRASIK
256. See Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. 182, 186, 303 A.2d 843, 846 (1973)
(Spaulding, J., dissenting) ("[wihile ... the Amendment does not adopt . . . extremist
views" it is not limited to political, educational or economic equality, but also extends to
domestic relations).
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